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Abstract Various studies have reported that moral intuitions about the permissibil-
ity of acts are subject to framing effects. This paper reports the results of a series
of experiments which further examine the susceptibility of moral intuitions to fram-
ing effects. The main aim was to test recent speculation that intuitions about the
moral relevance of certain properties of cases might be relatively resistent to fram-
ing effects. If correct, this would provide a certain type of moral intuitionist with
the resources to resist challenges to the reliability of moral intuitions based on such
framing effects. And, fortunately for such intuitionists, although the results can’t be
used to mount a strident defence of intuitionism, the results do serve to shift the bur-
den of proof onto those who would claim that intuitions about moral relevance are
problematically sensitive to framing effects.
1 Experimental Ethics and the Reliability of Intuitions
In recent decades, psychologists, economists and experimental philosophers have
examined the factors underlying moral intuitions (see, e.g., Cushman et al. 2006;
Gold et al. 2015; Greene 2009, Greene et al. 2001, 2004, 2008; Hauser et al. 2007;
Mikhail 2000, 2006, 2007; Petrinovich and O’Neill 1996; Waldmann and Dieterich
2007). Typically the focus has been on intuitions about the moral permissibility of
actions. Such intuitions have been shown to vary between different types of trolley
cases (Cushman et al. 2006; Greene et al. 2001; Hauser et al. 2007) and progress has
been made in understanding the mechanisms underlying such differences (Cushman
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and Greene 2012; Greene et al. 2009). In this literature, there has been particular
focus on the extent to which participants’ intuitions about permissibility are driven by
‘consequentialist’ or ‘deontological’ considerations. Accordingly, much of the focus
has been on intuitions about cases which aim to tease apart such considerations. In
particular, various types of trolley case have been used in which a protagonist can by
various means prevent a runaway train from causing five deaths and bring about the
death of an innocent bystander.
Here are the four trolley cases which I will be using in this paper (these are taken
from Liao et al. 2011 with minor changes).
Switch A runaway trolley is headed toward five innocent people who are on the
track and who will be killed unless something is done. Abigail can push a button,
which will redirect the trolley onto a second track, saving the five people. How-
ever, on this second track is an innocent bystander, who will be killed if the trolley
is turned onto this track.
Push A runaway trolley is headed toward five innocent people who are on the
track and who will be killed unless something is done. Abigail can push a button,
which will activate a moveable platform that will move an innocent bystander in
front of the trolley. The runaway trolley would be stopped by hitting the innocent
bystander, thereby saving the five but killing the innocent bystander.
Physical A runaway trolley is headed toward five innocent people who are on the
track and who will be killed unless something is done. Abigail can run to a nearby
bridge on which a heavy bystander is standing and push this bystander from the
bridge. The runaway trolley would be stopped by hitting the innocent bystander,
thereby saving the five but killing the innocent bystander.
Loop A runaway trolley is headed toward five innocent people who are on the track
and who will be killed unless something is done. Abigail can push a button, which
will redirect the train onto a second track, where there is an innocent bystander.
The runaway trolley would be stopped by hitting the innocent bystander, thereby
saving the five but killing the innocent bystander. The second track loops back
towards the five people. Hence, if it were not the case that the trolley would hit the
innocent bystander and grind to a halt, the train would go around and kill the five
people.
The empirical investigation of the causal factors underpinning our moral intuitions
potentially has important implications for moral philosophy. Intuitions about cases
are often taken as the primary source of evidence for and against theories in normative
ethics. If empirical investigation were to show intuitions to be sensitive to factors
which are clearly irrelevant to whether an act is in fact moral permissible, this would
raise serious worries about the reliability of intuitions and thus about the epistemic
foundation of moral philosophy.
This is not just a hypothetical challenge. Various researchers have reported results
which suggest that moral intuitions are sensitive to such irrelevant factors. One
such factor is that moral intuitions appear to be sensitive to order of presenta-
tion (Lanteri et al. 2008; Lombrozo 2009; Nichols and Mallon 2006; Petrinovich
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and O’Neill 1996; Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2015; Wiegmann et al. 2012).1 By
this point, quite a number of studies have reported such results (for a survey, see,
Wiegmann et al. 2012). In the following, I focus on two particular types of order
effects which have been reported to influence participants’ judgements about moral
responsibility.2
Switch effects Acting in Switch receives lower permissibility ratings when it fol-
lows Push or Physical (relative to when Switch is presented first). Such an effect
has been found in a number of studies (Lombrozo 2009; Nichols and Mallon 2006;
Wiegmann et al. 2012).
Loop effects Acting in Loop receives lower permissibility ratings when it follows
Push or Physical (compared to when Loop follows Switch). This effect is reported
in Liao et al. (2011). Indeed, Liao et al. (2011) find that a greater proportion of
participants agree that pushing the button is permissible in Loop when it follows
Switch rather than Push.
There is also evidence that intuitions about permissibility are subject to two other
effects of framing.3
Actor-Observer effects Acting in a case, e.g., Switch, receives lower permissibil-
ity ratings when the case concerns the actions of the participant themselves than
when the actions are those of a third party (Nadelhoffer and Feltz 2008).
Asian-Disease effects Tversky and Kahneman (1981) find a robust framing effect
whereby whether the outcomes of potential government programmes are described
in terms of numbers of people being ‘saved’ or ‘dying’ strongly influences
which of the two programmes participants prefer. Participants prefer Program
A (described as saving 200 people) to Program B (described as involving a
1/3 probability all 600 will be saved and 2/3 that no one will be saved),
but prefer Program B when these same outcomes are described in terms of
death.
I should also note that here are various types of responses which one might
give to the challenge that evidence of framing effects presents to the meth-
ods and epistemology of moral philosophy. For some discussion of some of
them, see Nado (2014), Demaree-Cotton (2015), and Andow (2015, 2016). How-
ever, my focus in this paper is to consider one particular type of underexplored
response.
1See Wiegmann and Waldmann (2014) for one explanation of these (which they call ‘transfer’ effects).
2I will call both Switch and Loop effects ‘order’ effects. Some might want to reserve the expression ‘order
effect’ for effects like Switch effect where the order of scenarios is manipulated rather than those like
Loop effects where what is manipulated is which scenario is presented directly before a target scenario.
Nothing turns on this terminological choice.
3There are various other framing effects which have also been reported (see, e.g., Bartels 2008; Gonnerman
et al. 2011; Nahmias et al. 2007; Nichols and Knobe 2007; Tobia et al. 2013; Weinberg et al. 2012). I will
only in detail those which play a role in the experimental studies reported later in the paper.
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2 The Intuitionist Resistance
The epistemic foundation of moral philosophy is only threatened by the finding that
irrelevant framings influence moral intuitions given certain assumptions about moral
epistemology. The threat depends on the idea that intuitions play an important role
in moral epistemology, yes, but it also depends on the idea that a certain kind of
intuitions play an important role. It is very easy to state the empirical challenge such
that it assumes an overly simplistic view of intuition-based understandings of the
methods and epistemology of moral philosophy.
Importantly, some of the most influential intuitionists such as Ross (2002) do not
place any significant weight on intuitive judgments about the permissibility of certain
actions in certain types of scenario. Instead, the emphasis is on the self-evidence of
prima facie duties. Here’s how Stratton-Lake (2014) explains that notion
. . . principles of prima facie duty are, roughly, principles stating that certain
facts count in favour of an act and others count against. So these principles
state, for instance, that the fact that one’s act would produce some good, or the
fact that it would be the keeping of a promise, or the expression of gratitude,
etc., counts in favour of it, and the fact that, for example, it would involve
the infliction of harm on someone counts against it. What we ought to do is
determined by all of these facts, and how they weigh up against each other.
Ross denied that we can ever know what we ought to do, and rejected the view
that there could be strictly universal, self-evident principles specifying what we
ought to do.
Indeed, Stratton-Lake (2014) goes so far as to suggest that intuitionists such as
Ross have the resources to resist the extant challenges to the epistemology of moral
philosophy discussed in the previous section. These challenges are based on evidence
of the unreliability of intuitions about the moral permissibility of actions. But, for all
such evidence shows, intuitions about prima facie or pro tanto duties, or as I shall
call them intuitions about moral relevance, may be reliable sources of evidence about
what counts in favour of and counts against actions.4
As Stratton-Lake (2014) puts it
. . . it is hard to imagine someone thinking that the fact that one would have to
kill an innocent person in order to save five didn’t count against it, or that the
fact that their act would save five innocent people didn’t count in favour of it,
regardless of their overall verdict about whether they should kill the one or let
the five die. That their act involved physically pushing someone in front of the
trolley, or pulling a lever that would release a trap door dropping them onto the
track would plausibly make no difference to such intuitions. Nor would framing
4It is worth noting that the same lessons apply mutatis mutandis for particularists such as Dancy (1983).
While particularists accept the idea that the very same feature which counts in favour of acting in one case
may count against acting in another case, no sensible particularist should be open to the idea, for example,
that the same feature might count against acting in case A when preceded by case B, yet in favour of acting
in that very same case A when preceded by a third case C. But I will not discuss particularism any further
here.
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effects introduced by the order of presentation of the cases. If such a priori
expectations are correct—and they would need to be empirically tested—then
empirical psychology would raise no problems for a Rossian intuitionism that
claims only that principles of prima facie duty are self-evident.
Stratton-Lake’s comments specifically concern Ross’s picture of the epistemic
foundations of moral philosophy. However, the point can be a more general one. Intu-
itions about moral permissibility are plausibly not the only moral intuitions which
play an epistemic role in moral philosophy. As well as intuitions about what is per-
missible and what is not, we are plausibly guided by intuitions about what counts
in favour of and against acting in certain ways, about what factors are of moral sig-
nificance, about what the morally relevant considerations are. Any intuitionist who
places such intuitions at the foundation of their moral epistemology rather than intu-
itions about permissibility seems to be able to make use of the line of resistance
Stratton-Lake outlines.
So, can such intuitionists weather the empirical challenge to the epistemic foun-
dation of moral philosophy? There is a debate to be had here about where the burden
of proof lies. Is it on the moral intuitionist to demonstrate the reliability of intuitions
about moral relevance? Or is it on the skeptic to demonstrate such intuitions’ unrelia-
bility? There are considerations that speak each way. In this respect, their position is
akin to that of those who attempt to mount an ‘expertise defence’ of intuitions in the
face of evidence of unreliability. There’s an important question about whether one
is entitled to assume that the experts are more reliable than ordinary people in the
absence of further relevant evidence.5 Debates like these are tricky ones. One can,
however, bypass such debates by taking up the burden of proof for oneself. This is
what I have done in the following. In the remainder of this paper, I report the results of
a series of experiments which aim to investigate whether intuitions about moral rel-




Experiment 1a examines whether intuitions about moral relevance are subject to the
‘actor-observer’ effect whereby participants seem to hold themselves to different
moral standards than they do other people.
Participants In this and the rest of the experiments reported in the paper, partic-
ipants were recruited using Prolific Academic, a UK-based equivalent to Amazon
MTurk, and completed an online survey built using Qualtrics. Participants were not
permitted to take part in more than one of the studies presented in this paper (with one
5I have argued elsewhere that, although an ‘expertise defence’ of philosophers’ intuitions may fail for
other reasons, such an assumption is in fact justified (Andow 2015).
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exception).6 In this, and the other studies, all participants were resident in the UK,
native English speakers, and at least 18 years old. 199 participants were recruited.
Mean age was 31.07. 110 were Male (55.3%), and the rest female. 30 had studied
some philosophy at university level (15.1%). In all the studies in this paper, partic-
ipants were rewarded for their participation (£0.17 @ £5.10/h based on a predicted
completion time of 2 minutes).
Materials Participants were randomly allocated to receive questions about one of
four cases. Two of these cases were the standard Push and Switch cases, which we’ll
call Observer versions. The remaining two were Actor versions of Push and Switch in
which ‘Abigail’ is replaced with ‘you’. Following each case, participants were asked
two questions to gauge their intuitions about moral relevance (order randomized).
The statements used were CA and CF. The wording of these statements is inspired
by the prediction of Stratton-Lake (quoted in Section 2).
CA – The fact that pushing the [button/bystander] will lead to the death of
one innocent bystander who would otherwise have survived counts against
[Abigail/you] pushing the [button/bystander].
CF – The fact that pushing the [button/bystander] will prevent the death of
five innocent people who would otherwise have died counts in favour of
[Abigail/you] pushing the [button/bystander].
Responses to all statements were given on a 6-point scale from ‘strongly disagree’ to
‘strongly agree’. Finally basic demographic information was requested.
Results The mean ratings of relevance by condition are in Table 1 and displayed in
Fig. 1.
A 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA was conducted with condition (Actor, Observer) and sce-
nario (Switch, Push) as between-subjects factors and question-type (CA, CF) as a
within-subjects factor. The three-way interaction was not significant (p = .480) nei-
ther were the two-way interactions between question-type and condition (p = .906),
or condition and scenario (p = .183). There was a significant interaction between
question-type and scenario (F(1, 195) = 5.07, p = .025, η2p = .025).7 There was
borderline significant main effect of scenario (F(1, 195) = 3.71, p = .056, η2p =
.019), but not of condition (p = .675).
To consider the nature of the interaction between question-type and scenario, two
independent samples t-tests were conducted. For CF, participants gave lower ratings
for Push than Switch (t (191.331) = 3.03, p = .003, d = 0.34).8 There was no sig-
nificant difference for ratings of CA (p = .952). Pearson’s chi-squared tests reveal
6The exception is Experiment 3c which was run more than 8 months after the next most recent study in
this paper. Participants who took part in previous studies were allowed to take part in Experiment 3c.
7The standardly used rules of thumb for interpreting partial eta-squared (η2p) are that a small effect = 0.01,
medium = 0.06, and large = 0.14.
8The standardly used rules of thumb for interpreting Cohen’s d are that a small effect= 0.2, medium= 0.5,
and large = 0.8.
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Table 1 Mean responses and standard deviations for relevance items (Experiment 1a)
Condition Scenario Statement N Mean SD Percent Agree
Actor Switch CA 50 4.22 1.25 76%
CF 50 4.64 1.35 84%
Push CA 50 4.34 1.64 74%
CF 50 4.34 1.51 76%
Observer Switch CA 50 4.28 1.49 74%
CF 50 4.86 1.20 90%
Push CA 49 4.18 1.58 74%
CF 49 3.96 1.49 69%
a significant difference between the proportion of participants in the different sce-
narios who agree with CF (χ2(1, 199) = 6.31, p = .012, φ = .178) but not CA
(p = .838).9
Discussion Experiment 1a finds no evidence that intuitions about moral relevance
are subject to Actor-Observer effects. This is somewhat surprising as differences
between actor and observer framings are well documented and widespread in
psychology. Moral intuitionists might take some comfort from this result.
However, there are two observations we can make about these results which should
perhaps trouble the intuitionist. The first potentially worrying observation is that
Experiment 1a finds some perhaps surprisingly high levels of disagreement with the
relevance items. Stratton-Lake claimed that it is hard to imagine someone disagree-
ing with claims such as “The fact that ... will lead to the death of one innocent
bystander who would otherwise have survived counts against ...”. Indeed, the Rossian
intuitionist might be inclined to count such a claim among their ‘self-evident princi-
ples’ of prima facie duty. However, in this experiment, around 25% of participants
fail to agree that the fact an action will cause a death counts against it (across all four
groups).
The second is that levels of agreement with CF in particular seem to vary
significantly between Switch and Push. So, even if there is no evidence of an Actor-
Observer framing effect, one might see some epistemically worrying aspects to these
results. If participants say that a certain feature counts against Push but not against
Switch then they are either not interpreting the question as one about the moral rel-
evance of certain factors or else they are exhibiting an epistemically troubling kind
of inconsistency (for the difference between Push and Switch is irrelevant to the
facts about whether an action prevents deaths counts in favour of perfoming it). Nat-
urally, given this between-subject design, no participant is recorded giving such an
‘inconsistent’ response pattern. However, the pattern of results is nonetheless notable.
9The standardly used rules of thumb for interpreting phi (φ) are that a small effect = 0.1, medium = 0.3,
and large = 0.5.
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Fig. 1 Mean ratings of agreement with the relevance items (CA and CF) for both scenarios (Push and
Switch) by condition (Actor, Observer). Error bars indicate one standard error. (Experiment 1a)
Either of these observations might also be used to raise doubts about whether
participants are responding to the relevance items in the intended fashion. This issue
will be discussed in detail in the general discussion.
3.2 Experiment 1b
This experiment represents a slight variation on Experiment 1a. There are two main
changes. First, the Physical scenario was not used in Experiment 1a, but might be
thought to be more likely to exhibit an Actor-Observer effect. Consequently, it is used
here. Second, the between-subjects design in Experiment 1a, didn’t allow for a direct
measurement of how many participants give seemingly inconsistent responses to CA
and CF items across different scenarios. Consequently, in Experiment 1b, scenario
(Physical, Switch) is a within-subjects factor rather than between-subjects factor.
Participants 204 participants were recruited. Mean age was 33.93. 82 were Male,
120 Female, and the rest Other. 12 had studied some philosophy at university level
(5.90%).
Materials Each participant answered both CA and CF questions (order randomized)
about both Switch and Physical (order randomized). Participants were randomly
assigned to receive questions about Actor or Observer versions of scenarios. Basic
demographic information was collected.
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Results The mean ratings of relevance by condition are in Table 2 and displayed in
Fig. 2.
A 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA was conducted with condition (Actor, Observer) as a
between-subjects factor and scenario (Physical, Switch) and question-type (CA,CF)
as within-subjects factors. The three-way interaction was not significant (p = .549).
Neither were the two-way interactions between question-type and condition (p =
.357) and scenario and condition (p = .169). There was a significant interaction
between question-type and scenario (F(1, 202) = 46.395, p < .0005, η2p = .187).
There was no significant main effect of condition (p = .151). There were significant
main effects of question-type (F(1, 202) = 5.07, p = .025, η2p = .024) and scenario
(F(1, 202) = 5.56, p = .019, η2p = .027).
To consider the nature of the interaction between question-type (CA vs CF) and
scenario (Physical vs Switch), two paired samples t-tests were conducted. For CF,
participants gave lower ratings for Physical than Switch (t (203) = 6.32, p <
.0005, d = .44). For CA, participants gave higher ratings for Physical than Switch
(t (203) = 4.22, p < .0005, d = .30). Pearson’s chi-squared tests reveal a signif-
icant difference in between the proportion of participants in the different Scenarios
agreeing with CF (χ2(1, 204) = 68.42, p < .0005, φ = .58) and CA (χ2(1, 204) =
64.71, p < .0005, φ = .56). The proportion of participants giving inconsistent
answers across the two scenarios was 20% for CF and 17% for CA.
Discussion Like Experiment 1a, Experiment 1b also fails to find any evidence that
intuitions about moral relevance are subject to Actor-Observer effects. This is a
notable result as differences between actor and observer framings are well docu-
mented and widespread in psychology. Again, it may be that intuitions about moral
relevance are subject to actor-observer effects which the current studies did not have
power to detect. However, if that is so, then the distorting effects are small.
However, following up on the issues about apparently inconsistent patterns of
response flagged up in the discussion for Experiment 1a, the results of Experiment
1b are not entirely comforting for intuitionist. Around one in five participants indi-
cates attitudes about moral relevance which an intuitionist would deem inconsistent,
e.g., they think that the fact that acting will lead to a death counts against acting in
Table 2 Mean responses and standard deviations for relevance items (Experiment 1b)
Condition Scenario Statement N Mean SD Percent Agree
Actor Switch CA 102 4.44 1.51 74%
CF 102 4.39 1.70 77%
Push CA 102 4.67 1.45 79%
CF 102 3.75 1.79 63%
Observer Switch CA 102 4.00 1.43 68%
CF 102 4.31 1.48 77%
Push CA 102 4.46 1.38 78%
CF 102 3.75 1.64 60%
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Fig. 2 Mean ratings of agreement with the relevance items (CA and CF) for both scenarios (Physical and
Switch) by condition (Actor, Observer). Error bars indicate one standard error. (Experiment 1b)
Physical but not in Switch (despite the fact that both cases have this feature). Again,
the low levels of agreement with the relevance items doesn’t fit particularly well with
Stratton-Lake’s predictions (see Section 2).
Again, either of these findings might be taken to raise a question as to whether
participants are responding to the items in the intended fashion—concerns of this
kind will be followed up later in the general discussion.
4 Asian Disease Effects
4.1 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 examines whether intuitions about moral relevance are subject to the
‘Asian-Disease’ type of framing effect introduced in Section 1.
Participants 98 participants were recruited. A small number of participants were
excluded prior to this count who either did not complete the survey or else gave an
incorrect answer to a simple comprehension question. Mean age was 31.38. 40 were
Male and the rest Female. 17 had previously studied some philosophy or psychology
at university level. 3 participants indicated a prior familiarity with the ‘Asian disease’
type of cases.
Materials Participants read a case slightly adapted from Tversky and Kahneman:
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Imagine that the UK is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual disease, which
is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the dis-
ease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the
consequences of the programs are as follows:
Participants were asked a simple comprehension question. Half of participants then
were asked which of the following programes they favoured:
• If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
• If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved,
and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.
While the other half were asked about the following two programmes (which are
equivalent but framed in terms of death rather than saving).
• If Program A is adopted 400 people will die.
• If Program B is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3
probability that 600 people will die.
Both groups were then asked about four items concerning moral relevance (order
randomized). The relevance items were as follows:
Regardless of which program you ultimately favour, please indicate the
extent to which you agree with the following statements.
• CFA – The fact that adopting Program A will lead to 200 people [being
saved/not dying] from the disease counts in favour of Program A.
• CAA – The fact that adopting Program A will lead to 400 people [not being
saved/dying] from the disease counts against Program A.
• CFB – The fact that adopting Program Bmight lead to [all 600 people being
saved/none of the 600 people dying] from the disease counts in favour of
Program B.
• CAB – The fact that adopting Program B might lead to [none of the 600
people being saved/all 600 people dying] from the disease counts against
Program B.
Answers were provided on a 6-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly
agree). Finally demographic information was collected.
Results The effect of framing on intuitions about which programme is favourable
was significant. There was a difference between conditions with respect to which
programme was favourable (χ2(1, N = 98) = 21.59, p < .001, φ = .47): 66%
of participants who received the ‘save’ framing chose program A, compared to only
19.6% of participants who received the ‘death’ framing.
Means and standard deviations for all relevance items by condition are in Table 3,
see also Fig. 3. To analyze the data concerning intuitions about moral relevance, I
treat intuitions about what are morally relevant considerations in the case of Pro-
gramme A and what are morally relevant considerations in the case of Programme
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Table 3 Means and standard deviations for all relevance items (Experiment 2)
Condition Statement N Mean SD Percent Agree
Save CFA 47 4.74 1.11 87%
CAA 47 4.34 1.27 74%
CFB 47 4.74 1.01 94%
CAB 47 4.79 1.12 91%
Death CFA 51 4.57 0.94 90%
CAA 51 5.18 1.20 92%
CFB 51 4.67 1.21 84%
CAB 51 4.51 1.24 84%
B separately. The rationale for this is that participants are asked what counts for and
against two distinct options (unlike in the trolley cases where participants were just
asked what counts for and against pushing the bystander/button).
First, consider intuitions about relevance concerning Programme A. A 2 × 2
ANOVA was conducted with condition (Save, Death) as a between-subjects factor
and question-type (CAA,CFA) as a within-subjects factor. There was a significant
interaction (F(1, 96) = 10.67, p = .002, η2p = .100). The main effect of con-
dition was trending but not significant (F(1, 96) = 3.80, p = .054, η2p = .038).
Fig. 3 Mean ratings of agreement with the relevance items (CAA, CFA, CAB, CFB) by framing (Save,
Death). Error bars indicate one standard error. (Experiment 2)
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There was no significant main effect of question-type (p = .513). To consider the
nature of the interaction, two independent-samples t-tests were conducted. CAA rat-
ings were found to be significantly higher for the Death framing than the Switch
(t (96) = 3.35, p = .001, d = .68), but there was no difference between fram-
ings for CFA (p = .399). Pearson’s chi-squared tests reveal a significant difference
between the proportion of participants in the different framings agreeing with CAA
(χ2(1, 98) = 5.60, p = .018, φ = .24) but not CFA (p = .643).
Now, consider intuitions about relevance concerning Programme B. A 2 x 2
ANOVA was conducted with condition (Save, Death) as a between-subjects factor
and question-type (CAB,CFB) as a within-subjects factor. Neither the interaction
(p = .483) nor the main effects of question-type (p = .688) or condition (p = .339)
were significant.
Discussion It seems that framing reasons in terms of ‘saving’ and ‘death’ may have
some influence on judgments about what is morally relevant. For example, Program
A results in 400 people no longer being alive, which might be taken to count against
Program A. One can frame this in terms of (a) the 400 people dying or (b) the same
people not being saved from the disease. When framed in terms of death, participants
seem to think this is a more relevant consideration. However, the effects of framing
do not seem to extend to intuitions about relevance concerning Program B.
Tversky and Kahneman articulate the effect of framing on judgments about which
program is favourable in terms of asymmetrical attitudes towards risk taking: people
favour the 2/3 risk that 600 will die over the certainty of 400 deaths; but people favour
the certainty of saving 200 lives over the risk that no one will be saved. However, the
results of the current study suggests that the framing affects intuitions about moral
relevance not with respect to the risky option – Program B – but with respect to
the option involving certainties. Taken in isolation, then, the current results might
suggest that favouring Program A over B given the ‘save’ framing is more the result
of (a) a lower inclination to see ‘leading to 400 people [not being saved/dying]’ as
a consideration against Program A, than (b) a differential attitude to risk. However,
more research would need to be done to establish this, and more work be done to
consider this result within the wider context of research on attitudes to risk.
Note that in this study, the levels of disagreement with the relevance items are
notably lower than in Experiments 1a and 1b. This may perhaps be due to the precise
way in which the statements were introduced, i.e., including “Regardless of which
programme you ultimately favour”, which may clarify the nature of the question for
participants. Note that the previously discussed issue of participants giving appar-
ently inconsistent response patterns doesn’t so clearly arise as different questions
about relevance are asked about Programme A and Programme B.
5 Order Effects
Experiments 3a, 3b, and 3c examine the extent to which intuitions about relevance
are subject to Switch and Loop order effects (as described in Section 1).
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5.1 Experiment 3a
Participants 320 participants were recruited. In this study, mean age was 29.41, 176
participants were Male (55%), 143 Female (44.7%), and 1 Other (0.3%). Fifty-seven
had studied some philosophy at university level (17.8%).
Methods Each participant saw two cases. The cases used were Switch, Physical and
Loop (see Section 1 above). Participants were randomly allocated to one of three
orders: (1) Physical, Loop; (2) Physical, Switch. (3) Switch, Loop. Participants were
asked to rate their agreement with CA and CF (order randomized). Finally basic
demographic information was requested.
Switch Effect Results The mean ratings of relevance for Switch by condition are in
Table 4 and displayed in Fig. 4.
A 2× 2 ANOVAwas conducted with order (Physical-Switch, Switch-Loop) as a bet-
ween-subjects factor and question-type (CA, CF) as a within-subjects factor. There
was no significant interaction (p = .101). The main effects of order (F(1, 208) =
5.93, p = .016, η2p = .028) and question-type (F(1, 208) = 10.78, p = .001, η2p =
.049) were significant. Coding responses as ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ allows us to
examine the proportion of participants who agree with CA/CF for each order of pre-
sentation (also in Table 4). Pearson’s chi-squared tests indicated no effect of order
on the proportion of participants who agree with CA (p = .43). However, a signifi-
cantly higher proportion of participants agreed with CF when Switch was presented
first (p = .03, φ = .16).
Loop Effect Results The mean ratings of relevance for Loop by condition are in
Table 5 and displayed in Fig. 5.
A 2 × 2 ANOVA was conducted with order (Physical-Loop, Switch-Loop) as
a between-subjects factor and question-type (CA, CF) as a within-subjects factor.
There was a significant interaction (F(1, 215) = 4.48, p = .035, η2p = .02). There
was no significant main effect of order (p = .633) or question-type (p = .505).
To consider the nature of the interaction, two independent-samples t-tests were con-
ducted. There was a borderline significant effect of order on CA (t (215) = 1.94, p =
.054, d = .29) but not CF (p = .212). These responses were coded as ‘agree’ or
‘disagree’ as before. Pearson’s chi-squared tests indicate no effect of order on the
proportion of participants who agree with CA (p = .25) or CF (p = .43).
Table 4 Mean ratings and standard deviations in Switch by order (Experiment 3a)
Condition Statement N Mean SD Percent Agree
Physical-Switch CA 103 3.88 1.21 66%
CF 103 4.11 1.43 69%
Switch-Loop CA 107 3.96 1.41 71%
CF 107 4.64 1.29 82%
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Fig. 4 Mean ratings of agreement with the relevance items (CA, CF) for Switch by Order (Switch-Loop,
Physical-Switch). Error bars indicate one standard error. (Experiment 3a)
Discussion As in Experiments 1a and 1b, the apparent levels of the disagreement
with the relevance items is surprisingly high. In the switch case, 45% of participants
seem to indicate some level of disagreement with CA. As in the previous studies, this
raises a potential worry that participants’ responses to CA and CF do not reflect their
intuitions about what counts in favour of and against acting. This feature of the results
thus provides some motivation for using a different question design, e.g., similar to
that used in Experiment 2.
However, let’s consider what the findings of Experiment 3a mean under the
assumption that the results do reflect participants’ intuitions about moral relevance.
Experiment 3a reveals some signs of order effects in participants’ responses to CA
and CF. Let’s consider loop effects first. Here, there is a small interaction between
order and question-type. This indicates that order affects what participants’ think
to be of most relevance. Seeing Physical first seems to lead to participants leaning
towards CA and, more importantly, away from CF. The most important difference
Table 5 Mean ratings and standard deviations in Loop by order (Experiment 3a)
Condition Statement N Mean SD Percent Agree
Physical-Loop CA 110 4.27 1.31 72%
CF 110 4.06 1.45 71%
Switch-Loop CA 107 3.91 1.47 65%
CF 107 4.31 1.43 76%
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Fig. 5 Mean ratings of agreement with the relevance items (CA, CF) for Loop by Order (Physical-Loop,
Switch-Loop). Error bars indicate one standard error. (Experiment 3a)
seems to be the shift in levels of agreement with CF from 82% when Switch is pre-
sented first to 69%when Physical is presented first. The same pattern is also reflected
slightly in the results concerning switch effects. Although the interaction is not sig-
nificant in this case, the pattern of results suggests that seeing Physical first leads to
participants being more inclined to agree with CA and less inclined to agree with CF.
Note that it is not implausible to interpret this shift in responses as a shift in intuitions
about moral relevance, as seeing Physical first may incline participants to realise that
preventing deaths is actually not so very important to them. So, if these results can
be taken to reflect participants’ intuitions about moral relevance, then they suggest
that such intuitions may not be as stable as the intuitionist might have hoped: there
are some signs that they are subject to irrelevant effects.
5.2 Experiment 3b
Like Experiment 3a, Experiment 3b aims to examine the extent to which intuitions
about moral relevance are subject to Switch and Loop effects. However, Experiment
3b makes use of a slightly different question design which aims to guard against the
worry highlighted in the discussion of Experiment 1a that participants’ responses to
CA and CF may not reflect their intuitions about moral relevance. There are two
main changes: (1) participants receive either only CA or only CF statements; (2) the
relevance question in presented in a way which aims to more clearly distinguish it
from the issue of whether it is all things considered okay to push the button.
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Participants 246 participants were recruited. Mean age was 33.1 87 were Male
(35.4%), 156 Female (63.4%), and 3 other (1.2%). 21 had studied some philosophy
at university level (8.5%).
Materials The cases used were Physical, Switch and Loop. All participants saw
two cases. Participants were randomly allocated to received one of three orders:
(1) Physical-Switch; (2) Physical-Loop; (3) Switch-Loop. For each case seen,
participants were first asked about moral permissibility using statement MP:
It is morally permissible for Abigail to [push the button to redirect the train
onto the second track / push the bystander in front of the trolley].
Participants were then presented with the same case again, and invited to express
their intuitions about moral relevance of using the following wording similar to that
used in Experiment 2:
This time, regardless of whether or not you think it is morally permissi-
ble for Abigail to push the [button/bystander], please indicate the extent to
which you agree with the following statement.
Participants were randomly allocated to receive either CA or CF statements.
Responses to all statements were given on a 6-point scale from ‘strongly disagree’ to
‘strongly agree’.
Switch Effect Results The mean ratings of relevance for Switch by condition are in
Table 6 and displayed in Fig. 6.
A 2 × 2 ANOVA was conducted with order (Physical-Switch, Switch-Loop) and
question-type (CA, CF) as between-subjects factors. Neither the interaction effect
(p = .097), nor main effects of order (p = .059) or question-type (p = .399)
were significant. Pearson’s chi-squared tests reveal no significant differences in the
proportion of participants in the different framings agreeing with CA (p = .76) or
CF (p = .14).
Loop Effect Results The mean ratings of relevance for Loop by condition are in
Table 7 and displayed in Fig. 7.
A 2 × 2 ANOVA was conducted with order (physical-loop, switch-loop) and
question-type (CA, CF) as between-subjects factors. Neither the interaction effect
(p = .401), nor main effects of order (p = .777) or question-type (p = .147)
were significant. Pearson’s chi-squared tests reveal no significant differences in the
Table 6 Mean ratings and standard deviations in Switch (Experiment 3b)
Condition Statement N Mean SD Percent Agree
Physical-Switch CA 46 4.20 1.34 70%
CF 36 4.03 1.30 78%
Switch-Loop CA 33 4.24 1.39 73%
CF 49 4.76 1.15 90%
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Fig. 6 Mean ratings of agreement with the relevance items (CA, CF) for Switch by Order (Switch-Loop,
Physical-Switch). Error bars indicate one standard error. (Experiment 3b)
proportion of participants in the different framings agreeing with CA (p = .62) or
CF (p = .63).
Discussion These results still reveal a perhaps surprising degree of dissent from the
statements CA and CF—claims one might well have supposed to be obviously true
given the intended meaning—despite the efforts to ensure that the issue of relevance
is distinguished from that of permissibility. However, this experiment finds little evi-
dence of either Switch or Loop effects. It is possible that this experiment did not have
sufficient power to detect any small effects which are there. In both cases, there are
similar trends in the data to those in the previous experiment.
5.3 Experiment 3c
Like Experiment 3a and 3b, 3c aims to examine the extent to which intuitions about
moral relevance are subject to Switch and Loop effects. However, Experiment 3c
Table 7 Mean ratings and standard deviations in Loop (Experiment 3b)
Condition Statement N Mean SD Percent Agree
Physical-Loop CA 42 4.12 1.37 69%
CF 40 4.25 1.34 78%
Switch-Loop CA 33 4.00 1.46 64%
CF 49 4.49 1.28 82%
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Fig. 7 Mean ratings of agreement with the relevance items (CA, CF) for Loop by Order (Physical-Loop,
Switch-Loop). Error bars indicate one standard error. (Experiment 3b)
again makes use of a slightly different question design. This aims to further guard
against the worry that participants’ responses to CA and CF may not reflect their
intuitions about moral relevance. One reason to worry about the results from Exper-
iments 3a and 3b is the surprising level of dissent from CA and CF. The relevance
question is now presented in a way which aims to even more clearly distinguish it
from the issue of whether it is all things considered okay to push the button.
Participants 300 participants were recruited. Mean age was 36.54. 116 were Male
(28.7%), and 184 Female (61.3%). 16 had studied some philosophy at university level
(5.3%).
Materials The cases used were Physical, Switch and Loop. All participants saw
two cases. Participants were randomly allocated to received one of three orders: (1)
Physical-Switch; (2) Physical-Loop; (3) Switch-Loop. For each case, participants
were asked about new versions of CA and CF. The precise wording of the question
and items was as follows.
Sometimes in a difficult moral choice a person can have moral reasons to do
something, but also moral reasons not to do it. Regardless of what you think
about the best final decision in these cases, we would like to know whether
you agree about each of the following claims:
CA The fact that pushing the [button/bystander] will lead to the death of one
innocent bystander who would otherwise have survived is at least one moral
reason against Abigail pushing the [button/bystander].
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CF The fact that pushing the [button/bystander] will prevent the death of five
innocent people who would otherwise have died is at least one moral reason
in favour of Abigail pushing the [button/bystander].
This alternative wording, e.g., ‘at least one moral reason’, aims to make very clear to
participants the nature of the intuitions of interest. Participants received both CA and
CF in a randomised order. Responses to all statements were given on a 6-point scale
from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’.
Switch Effect Results The mean ratings of relevance for Switch by condition are in
Table 8 and displayed in Fig. 8.
A 2 × 2 ANOVA was conducted with order (Physical-Switch, Switch-Loop) as
a between-subject factor and question-type (CA, CF) as within-subjects factors. The
interaction was not significant (p = .099). Neither was there a significant main
effect of question-type (p = .838). However, there was a significant main effect of
order (F(1, 199) = 27.89, p < .0005, η2p = .12). Pearson’s chi-squared tests reveal
higher levels of agreement in Switch-Loop for CA (p = .019, φ = .165) and CF
(p < .0005, φ = .247).
Loop Effect Results The mean ratings of relevance for Loop by condition are in
Table 9 and displayed in Fig. 9.
A 2 × 2 ANOVA was conducted with order (Physical-Loop, Switch-Loop) as a
between-subject factor and question-type (CA, CF) as within-subjects factors. The
interaction was not significant (p = .246). Neither was there a significant main
effect of question-type (p = .157). However, there was a significant main effect of
order (F(1, 198) = 8.70, p = .004, η2p = .04). Pearson’s chi-squared tests reveal
no significant differences in the proportion of participants in the different framings
agreeing with CA (p = .288). However, the proportion in Switch-Loop who agreed
with CF was higher (p = .041, φ = .145).
Discussion Experiment 3c seems to show slighly lower levels of dissent from state-
ments CA and CF than that observed in Experiments 3a and 3b. That said, the
observed level might still trouble some intuitionists. For example, 25% of partici-
pants, in one condition, appear do not agree with idea that the fact that acting will
save five people who would otherwise have lived is at least one moral reason in favour
of acting. This issue will be taken up again in the general discussion.
Table 8 Mean ratings and standard deviations in Switch (Experiment 3c)
Condition Statement N Mean SD Percent Agree
Physical-Switch CA 100 4.35 1.39 78%
CF 100 4.18 1.45 75%
Switch-Loop CA 101 4.84 1.04 90%
CF 101 5.06 1.03 93%
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Fig. 8 Mean ratings of agreement with the relevance items (CA, CF) for Switch by Order (Switch-Loop,
Physical-Switch). Error bars indicate one standard error. (Experiment 3c)
Experiment 3c finds some evidence of both Switch and Loop order effects. More-
over, the pattern of results is highly consistent with that seen across Experiments 3a
and 3b. The main pattern for loop cases seems to be that seeing Physical first makes
participants less likely to agree with CF. The main pattern for switch effects seems to
be that seeing Physical first makes participants less likely to agree with both CA and
CF, and, although the interaction is not significant in this case, this reduction seems
to be more pronounced for CF.
Despite minor variations in which main effects and interactions were found to be
significant, the results of Experiments 3a–c are relatively consistent. On the one hand,
this internal consistency should bolster our trust in each of the three alternative ways
of probing intuitions about moral relevance used in Experiments 3a–c. On the other
hand, this evidence cumulatively suggests that such intuitions may be prone to some
small effects of order whereby prior exposure to Physical depresses participants’
intuitions concerning moral relevance.
Table 9 Mean ratings and standard deviations in Loop (Experiment 3c)
Condition Statement N Mean SD Percent Agree
Physical-Loop CA 99 4.49 1.21 82%
CF 99 4.53 1.30 84%
Switch-Loop CA 101 4.69 1.09 88%
CF 101 5.00 1.05 93%
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Fig. 9 Mean ratings of agreement with the relevance items (CA, CF) for Loop by Order (Physical-Loop,
Switch-Loop). Error bars indicate one standard error. (Experiment 3c)
6 General Discussion and Conclusions
Here is a brief summary of the main results of the studies reported above. Experi-
ments 1a and 1b finds no evidence of any actor-observer effect. Experiment 2 does
find some evidence that framing the scenario and responses in terms of ‘saving’ rather
than ‘dying’ has some effect on participants’ responses. However, the influence of
framing was limited: it was observed only for questions about one of the programs,
and in all cases and for all statements a large majority of participants indicate some
level of agreement. Experiments 3a, 3b, and 3c find no robust evidence of large order
effects of either the Switch or Loop variety. There does seem to be a consistent pat-
tern whereby seeing Physical first leads to lower ratings of the idea that the fact that
acting will save five people counts in favour of acting. However, such differences
do not consistently reach significance, and when they do, tend to be associated with
small effect sizes.10
What should we conclude on the basis of these results? My tentative answer is
going to be that they provide some indirect support for the intuitionist resistance
and that the burden is upon those who would undermine the epistemic standing of
intuitions about moral relevance to provide some convincing evidence. However, the
results in this paper can’t be used to mount an all out defence of intuitionist’s moral
epistemology. Certainly, they can’t be used to defend the conclusion that intuitions
about moral relevance are not subject to troubling framing effects. So before I get to
10There are two exceptions which shouldn’t be overlooked. These are the main effect of order in
Experiment 3b and the effect of framing on responses to statement CAA in Experiment 2.
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cautiously arguing that the results do provide some indirect support for the intuition-
ist’s case, I’ll first take some time to explain the various reasons why a more strident
defence isn’t possible on the basis of these results.
There are various aspects of the results reported that one might take to suggest that
the results do not genuinely reflect participants’ intuitions about moral relevance. I
will consider this possiblity shortly. However, even assuming that the current find-
ings do genuinely reflect participants’ intuitions about moral relevance, there are a
number of reasons why a strident defence is not possible. One straightforward reason
is that there are other types of framing effect, not directly investigated in this paper,
to which intuitions about relevance might be subject. A second is that one shouldn’t
overinterpret a null result. These studies find no convincing evidence of troublingly
large Switch, Loop, Actor-Observer or Asian-Disease effects on intuitions of moral
relevance. But this is, of course, not the same as convincing evidence that there are
no such effects on intuition about moral relevance.
Another reason that a strident defence of intuitionism is not possible on the basis
of the results reported here are is that there are actually various aspects of the results
which should trouble the intuitionist.
(1) The results were not completely absent of evidence of the specific types of
framing effect which the studies were trying to investigate; they did find some
small framing effects.
(2) The current studies found some convincing evidence of a different type of sen-
sitivity to irrelevant factors (albeit not the type of sensitivity they were trying to
find). In Experiment 1, around one in five participants seem to agree that a fac-
tor counts in favour of (or against) acting in Push (or Physical) but not Switch
(or vice versa) when it is present in both.11 This suggests a form of framing
effect which might be troubling for an intuitionist (although not, note, particu-
larists). For, such a response pattern, if it truly reflects participants’ intuitions
about whether certain features count in favour of or against actions, indicates
some degree of unreliability.
(3) The relevatively high levels of disagreement with the relevance items, e.g.,
CA and CF, found across all the experiments reported in this paper (ranging
from around 6% up to 40%), don’t sit easily within an intuitionist’s worldview.
Intuitionists are inclined to agree with Stratton-Lake that is hard to imagine
someone disagreeing with claims such as “The fact that ... will lead to the death
of one innocent bystander who would otherwise have survived counts against
...” and to think that claims such as these are among the ‘self-evident principles’
of prima facie duty. If the current results are to be believed, then the numbers of
participants who do not find such principles self-evident should perhaps trou-
ble the intuitionist. To the extent that intuitionists are surprised by the observed
levels of dissent, the current results cannot be used to mount a stident defence
of standard intuitionist approaches in moral philosophy. Why? Because surpris-
ing results concerning intuitions about moral relevance present a prima facie
11Revisiting the data for Experiment 3, a similar trend can be seen there too. To illustrate, in Experiment
3c, it is as high as 25% of participants giving inconsistent response patterns.
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challenge to the use of armchair intuitionist methodology. The philosophical
methods typically adopted by intuitionists don’t typically involve large scale
surveys of folk intuitions but rather depends on personal careful consideration
of cases.
(4) The main results of these experiments may underestimate the extent to which
intuitions about moral relevance of intuitions about moral relevance are sub-
ject to Switch, Loop, Actor-Observer, and Asian-Disease cases. The cases used
in the current studies are, for the most part, cases in which one might think
it is obvious what the morally relevant considerations are—deaths and saving
lives—even taking into account the surprising degree of dissent shown by par-
ticipants in the studies reported in this paper. But, of course, the intuitionist
epistemology is supposed to be a general moral epistemology. The intuition-
ist epistemology and methods are also supposed to apply in more complex and
subtle cases: cases in which it may not be so very obvious what the relevant con-
siderations are. One might suspect that intuitions about moral relevance in such
cases would be less secure and more prone to framing effects. Consequently,
a natural next step in the empirical investigation into intuitions about moral
relevance would be to examine whether intuitions about moral relevance were
subject to framing effects in more complex and subtle cases—cases in which it
is not immediately obvious what the morally relevant considerations might be
nor how strong they are.
Let’s turn to the possibility that the current results do not reflect participants’ intu-
itions about moral relevance. There are two aspects of the results that, one might
argue, would be so surprising under the assumption that the reflect participants’ gen-
uine intuitions about moral relevance that we should reject the assumption. The two
aspects in question are the following: the apparently inconsistent patterns of response
(agreeing with CA for Push but not Switch, for instance); and the relatively high
levels of dissent from the relevance items (ranging from around 6% up to 40%).
I don’t think we should be so skeptical that participants’ responses should be
interpreted as reporting their intuitions about moral relevance. One first reason for
resisting such a response is that I don’t think we should overplay how surprising
these results would be. Take the finding of some apparent inconsistency between
agreement with CA and CF between Push and Switch for example. In most of the
above studies, the number of participants giving such responses is around one in
five. This result is consistent with Demaree-Cotton (2015)’s analysis of the typical
magnitude of effects of framing on the polarity of intuitions across numerous stud-
ies on philosophical intuitions. Importantly, Demaree-Cotton herself argues that this
figure is in fact reassuringly low for proponents of intuition-based methods in phi-
losophy.12 Now, take the finding of relatively high levels of dissent from relevance
items. There are a number of reasons why we shouldn’t overestimate the scale of this
finding. Note that one never expects to find 100% agreement to survey questions, as
there will always be some noise in the sample due to a small number of participants
12Although, I have myself argued that smaller effects might nonetheless be troubling Andow (2016).
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who either aren’t paying attention, or make a mistake, or misunderstand the ques-
tion.13 Note also, one should expect some small number of participants to genuinely
disagree (e.g., because they endorse a form of nihilism about moral reasons).14 So,
while the results might be surprising if they reflect intuitions about moral relevance,
one shouldn’t overestimate the scale of the surprise.
A second reason is the fact that across Experiments 3a, 3b, and 3c the general
pattern of responses was fairly consistent. These three experiments used different
question designs. The alternative wordings used in Experiments 3b and 3c are closely
based on alternative forms of the question suggested by commenters who were ini-
tially concerned that the wording used in 3a was not effectively tapping intuitions
about moral relevance. So, absent further evidence, I think participants should be
interpreted as genuinely reporting intuitions about which factors are morally rele-
vant. One might well remain sceptical that participants’ fully considered judgments
about what factors are morally relevant—given appropriately lengthy amounts of
consideration or whatever conditions you deem necessary to reach a fully considered
judgment—would retain these high levels of dissent. However, I think it would be
unduly sceptical to doubt that participants are reporting their intial intuitions about
whether the stated factors are relevant.
Finally consider that, in Experiment 3c—the experiment with the form of ques-
tion which I take to be least ambiguous and most likely to elicit genuine intuitions
about moral relevance—the apparent level of dissent in the target cases is roughly
15% across all conditions and statements. Once we factor in the impact of noise,
e.g., participants who fail to pay attention, and understandable disagreement due to
beliefs such as moral nihilism, it may be that the level of apparent dissent is not so
surprisingly high in the first place.15
In light of these considerations, I am inclined to think that the current results
should be interpreted as indicating participants’ intuitions about moral relevance. Of
course, I can’t rule out that (some) participants are giving responses which indicate,
for example, (a) whether they think the stated reason is the most important reason
against action, (b) whether they think the bystander’s innocence is beside the point,
or even (c) simply whether they think the action is permissible. And future empirical
work, using different ways of probing the relevant intuitions, or perhaps using pro-
tocol analysis to investigate how participants are responding to questions of the form
used in the current studies, may be able to speak to these issues.
Indeed, this is far from the end of the road for empirical research into intuitions
about moral relevance.16 For example, in order to properly assess the standing of
13Regrettably, no attention checks were used in these experiments. However, participation was restricted
to those with a high rate of acceptance for their submissions in Prolific (> 90%).
14Although, this is likely to be pretty small. To illustrate, in Experiment 3a, only 4% of participants
disagreed with both relevance items for both cases they received, and nihilism isn’t the only coherent
motivation for giving such a response pattern.
15Although, note, the level of apparently inconsistent responses goes up to 25% in this experiment.
16One reviewer suggests that participants recruited through services such as Prolific and Mturk might be
familiar with trolley problems and questions like ‘Should one do x?’. In future work, it would be worth
taking steps to recruit participants who are not familiar with the task of providing normative judgments
about such cases.
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intuitionist’s epistemology, questions concerning expert intuitions about moral rel-
evance and intuitions formed after a greater opportunity to reflect will need to be
addressed empirically. One potential problem for the intuitionist resistance would be
if there were reason to expect that more reflection and greater expertise would lead to
intuitions about moral relevance being more susceptible to framing effects. I’ll admit
that I can’t easily anticipate a compelling argument to that effect. However, the intu-
itionist resistance would stand to be bolstered by concrete evidence concerning such
intuitions (or, of course, undermined, depending on the results). So, another natural
next step for this research project would be to conduct the relevant studies.
In sum: the current results certainly can’t be used to mount a strident defence of
intuitionist moral epistemology; nonetheless, I am inclined to think that the current
results might be cautiously used to provide some indirect support for the intuitionist
resistance. This indirect support is to shift the burden of proof onto those who would
empirically undermine intuitionism in moral philosophy on the basis that intuitions
about moral relevance are problematically sensitive to framing effects (in similar
ways to intuitions about permissibility).17 The main take-home message of the cur-
rent studies is that any such framing effects on intuitions about moral relevance are
minor. Intuitionists have predicted that intuitions about moral relevance would rather
stable (and, in particular, more stable than intuitions about moral permissibility)
(Stratton-Lake 2014). The burden is now upon their critics to produce data show-
ing that intuitions about moral relevance are problematically sensitive to effects of
framing, even if intuitionists are not entitled to assume that the epistemic standing of
intuitions about moral relevance is impeccable or that such intuitions are completely
immune to effects of framing.
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